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Abstract
Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples,
malicious inputs crafted to fool trained models. Adversar-
ial examples often exhibit black-box transfer, meaning that
adversarial examples for one model can fool another model.
However, adversarial examples are typically overfit to exploit
the particular architecture and feature representation of a
source model, resulting in sub-optimal black-box transfer at-
tacks to other target models. We introduce the Intermediate
Level Attack (ILA), which attempts to fine-tune an existing
adversarial example for greater black-box transferability
by increasing its perturbation on a pre-specified layer of
the source model, improving upon state-of-the-art methods.
We show that we can select a layer of the source model to
perturb without any knowledge of the target models while
achieving high transferability. Additionally, we provide some
explanatory insights regarding our method and the effect of
optimizing for adversarial examples in intermediate feature
maps.
1. Introduction
Adversarial examples are small, imperceptible pertur-
bations of images carefully crafted to fool trained models
[27, 7]. Studies such as [12] have shown that Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNNs) are particularly vulnerable to such
adversarial attacks. The existence of these adversarial at-
tacks suggests that our architectures and training procedures
produce fundamental blind spots in our models, and that our
models are not learning the same features that humans do.
These adversarial attacks are of interest for more than just
the theoretical issues they pose – concerns have also been
raised over the vulnerability of CNNs to these perturbations
∗Equal contribution.
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Figure 1: An example of an ILA modification of a pre-
existing adversarial example for ResNet18. ILA modifies
the adversarial example to increase its transferability. Note
that although the original ResNet18 adversarial example
managed to fool ResNet18, it does not manage to fool the
other networks. The ILA modification of the adversarial
example is, however, more transferable and is able to fool
more of the other networks.
in the real world, where they are used for mission-critical
applications such as online content filtration systems and
self-driving cars [6, 13]. As a result, a great deal of effort
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has been dedicated to studying adversarial perturbations.
Much of the literature has been dedicated to the development
of new attacks that use different perceptibility metrics [2, 25,
23], security settings (black box/white box) [21, 1], as well
as increasing efficiency [7]. Defending against adversarial
attacks is also well studied. In particular, adversarial training,
where models are trained on adversarial examples, has been
shown to be very effective under certain assumptions [16,
24].
Adversarial attacks can be classified into two categories:
white-box attacks and black-box attacks. In white-box at-
tacks, information of the model (i.e., its architecture, gradient
information, etc.) is accessible, whereas in black-box attacks,
the attackers have access only to the prediction. Black-box
attacks are a bigger concern for real-world applications for
the obvious reason that such applications typically will not
reveal their models publicly, especially when security is con-
cerned (e.g., objectionable content filters in social media).
Consequently, black-box attacks are mostly focused on the
transferability of adversarial examples [15].
Moreover, most attacks generated using white-box at-
tacks will sometimes successfully attack an unrelated model.
This phenomenon is known as “transferability.” However,
black-box success rates for an attack are nearly always lower
than that of white-box attacks, suggesting that the white-box
attacks overfit on the source model. Different adversarial
attacks transfer at different rates, but most of them are not
optimizing specifically for transferability. This paper aims to
achieve the goal of increasing the transferability of a given
adversarial example. To this end, we propose a novel method
that fine-tunes a given adversarial example through examin-
ing its representations in intermediate feature maps that we
call Intermediate Level Attack (ILA).
Our method draws upon two primary intuitions. First,
while we don’t expect the direction found by the original
adversarial attack to be the most optimal for transferability,
we do expect it to be a reasonable proxy, as it still transfers
far better than random noise would. As such, if we were
searching for a more transferable attack, we should be will-
ing to stray from our original attack direction in exchange for
increasing our norm.1 However, from the ineffectiveness of
noise on neural networks, we see that straying too far from
our original direction will cause us to lose effectiveness –
even if we are able to increase norm a modest amount. Thus,
we must balance staying close to the original direction and
increasing norm. A natural way to do so is to maximize our
projection onto the original adversarial perturbation.
Second, we note that although for transferability we’d
like to sacrifice some direction in exchange for increasing
the norm, we are unable to do so in the image space with-
out changing perceptibility, as norm and perceptibility are
1Attacks with a higher epsilon constraint are generally more effective,
including for black box attacks
intrinsically tied.2 However, if we examine the intermediate
feature maps, perceptibility (in image space) is no longer
intrinsically tied to the norm in an intermediate feature map,
and we may be able to increase the norm of our perturba-
tion in that feature space significantly with no change in
perceptibility back in our image space. We will investigate
the effects of using different intermediate feature maps on
transferability, and provide insights drawn from empirical
observations.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a novel method, ILA, that enhances black-
box adversarial transferability by increasing the pertur-
bation on a pre-specified layer of a model. We con-
duct a thorough evaluation that shows our method im-
proves upon state-of-the-art methods on multiple mod-
els across multiple datasets. See Sec. 4.
• We introduce a procedure, guided by empirical obser-
vations, for selecting a layer that maximizes the trans-
ferability using the source model alone - thus obviating
the need for evaluation on transfer models during hy-
perparameter optimization. See Sec. 4.2.
• Additionally, we provide insights into the effects of
optimizing for adversarial examples in intermediate
feature maps. See Sec. 5.
2. Background and Related Work
2.1. General Adversarial Attacks
An adversarial example for a given model is generated by
augmenting an image so that in the model’s decision space
its representation moves into the wrong region. Most prior
work in generating adversarial examples for attack focuses
on disturbing the softmax output space via the input space
[7, 16, 19, 5]. Some representative white-box attacks are the
following:
Gradient Based Approaches The Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [7] generates an adversarial example with
the update rule:
x′ = x+  · sign(∇xJ(x, y))
It is the linearization of the maximization problem
max
|x′−x|<
J(M(x′), y)
where x represents the original image; x′ is the adversar-
ial example; y is the ground-truth label and J is the loss
function; M is the model until the final softmax layer. Its
iterative version (I-FGSM) applies FGSM iteratively [13].
2Under the standard epsilon constraints
Intuitively, this fools the model by increasing its loss, which
eventually causes misclassification. In other words, it finds
perturbations in the direction of the loss gradient of the last
layer (i.e., the softmax layer).
Decision Boundary Based Approaches Deepfool [19]
produces approximately the closest adversarial example iter-
atively by stepping towards the nearest decision boundary.
Universal Adversarial Perturbation [18] uses this idea to craft
a single image-agnostic perturbation that pushes most of a
dataset’s images across a model’s classification boundary.
Model Ensemble Attack Above methods are designed to
yield the best performance only on the model they are tuned;
often, they do not transfer to other models. In contrast, [15]
proposed the Model-based Ensembling Attack that transfers
better by avoiding dependence on any specific model. It uses
k models with softmax outputs, notated as J1, . . . , Jk, and
solves
min
|x′−x|<
− log
(
k∑
i=1
αiJi(x
′)1y
)
+ λd(x, x′)
Using such an approach, the authors showed that the de-
cision boundaries of different CNNs align with each other.
Consequently, an adversarial example that fools multiple
models is likely to fool other models as well.
2.2. Intermediate-layer Adversarial Attacks
A small number of studies has focused on perturbing mid-
layer outputs. [20] perturbs mid-layer activations by crafting
a single universal perturbation that produces as many spuri-
ous mid-layer activations as possible. These include the Fea-
ture Adversary Attack [28, 22], which performs a targeted
attack by minimizing the distance of the representations of
two images in internal neural network layers (instead of in
the output layer). However, instead of emphasizing adversar-
ial transferability, it focuses more on internal representations.
Results in the paper show that even when given a guide im-
age and a dissimilar target image, it is possible to perturb the
target image to produce a much similar embedding to that of
the guide image.
Another recent work that examines the intermediate lay-
ers for the purposes of increasing transferability is TAP [29].
They attempt to maximize the norm between the original im-
age x and the adversarial example x′ at all layers. In contrast
to our approach, they do not attempt to take advantage of
a specific layer’s feature representations, instead choosing
to maximize the norm across all layers. In addition, unlike
their method which generates an entirely new adversarial ex-
ample, our method fine-tunes existing adversarial examples,
allowing us to leverage existing adversarial attacks. We also
show that our method improves upon theirs in Table 2.
3. Approach
Based on the motivation presented in the introduction,
we propose the Intermediate Level Attack (ILA) framework,
shown in Algorithm 2. Based on the form of loss function L,
we propose the following two variants. Note that we define
Fl(x) as the output of layer l of a network F given an input
x.
Require: Original image in dataset x; Adversarial exam-
ple x′ generated for x by baseline attack; Function Fl
that calculates intermediate layer output; L∞ bound ;
Learning rate lr; Iterations n; Loss function L.
1: procedure ILA(x′, Fl, , lr, L)
2: x′′ = x
3: i = 0
4: while i < n do
5: ∆y′l = Fl(x
′)− Fl(x)
6: ∆y′′l = Fl(x
′′)− Fl(x)
7: x′′ = x′′ − lr · sign(∇x′′L(y′l, y′′l ))
8: x′′ = clip(x′′ − x) + x
9: x′′ = clipimage range(x′′)
10: i = i+ 1
11: end while
12: return x′′
13: end procedure
Figure 2: Intermediate Level Attack algorithm
3.1. Intermediate Level Attack Projection (ILAP)
Loss
Given an adversarial example x′ generated by attack
method A for natural image x, we wish to enhance its
transferability by focusing on a layer l of a given network
F . Although x′ is not the optimal direction for transfer-
ability, we view x′ as a hint for this direction. We treat
∆y′l = Fl(x
′) − Fl(x) as a directional guide towards be-
coming more adversarial, with emphasis on the disturbance
at layer l. Our attack will attempt to find an x′′ such that
∆y′′l = Fl(x
′′)− Fl(x) matches the direction of ∆y′l while
maximizing the norm of the disturbance in that direction.
The high-level idea is that we want to maximize proj∆y′l∆y
′′
l
for the reasons expressed in Section 1. Since this is a max-
imization, we can disregard constants, and this simply be-
comes the dot product. The objective we solve is given
below, and we term it the ILA projection loss:
L(y′l, y
′′
l ) = −∆y′′l ·∆y′l (1)
3.2. IntermediateLevelAttackFlexible (ILAF)Loss
Since the image x′ may not be the optimal direction for
us to optimize towards, we may want to give the above loss
greater flexibility. We do this by explicitly balancing both
norm maximization and also fidelity to the adversarial di-
rection at layer l. We note that in a rough sense, ILAF is
optimizing for the same thing as ILAP. We augment the
above loss by separating out the maintenance of the adver-
sarial direction from the magnitude, and control the trade-off
with the additional parameter α to obtain the following loss,
termed ILA flexible loss:
L(y′l, y
′′
l ) =
− α · ‖∆y
′′
l ‖2
‖∆y′l‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
maximize disturbance
− ∆y
′′
l
‖∆y′′l ‖2
· ∆y
′
l
‖∆y′l‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
maintain original direction
(2)
3.3. Attack
In practice, we choose either the ILAP or ILAF loss and
iterate n times to attain an approximate solution to the respec-
tive maximization objective. Note that the projection loss
only has the layer l as a hyperparameter, whereas the flexible
loss also has the additional loss weight α as a hyperparam-
eter. The above attack assumes that x′ is a pre-generated
adversarial example. As such, the attack can be viewed as
a fine-tuning of the adversarial example x′. We fine-tune
for greater norm of the output difference at layer l (which
we hope will be conducive to greater transferability) while
attempting to preserve the output difference’s direction to
avoid destroying the original adversarial structure.
4. Results
We start by showing that ILAP increases transferability
for all base attack methods tested, including MI-FGSM [5]
and Carlini-Wagner [3] in Table 1, as well as Transferable
Adversarial Perturbations[29] in Table 2. Results for IFGSM,
FGSM, and Deepfool are shown in Appendix A 3. We test
on a variety of models, namely: ResNet18 [8], SENet18 [9],
DenseNet121 [10] and GoogLeNet [26]. Architecture details
are specified in Appendix A; note that in the below results
sections, instead of referring to the architecture specific layer
names, we refer to layer indices (e.g. l = 0 is the last
layer of the first block). Our models are trained on CIFAR-
10 [11] with the code and hyperparameters in [14] to final
test accuracies of 94.8% for ResNet18, 94.6% for SENet18,
95.6% for DenseNet121, and 94.9% for GoogLeNet.
For a fair comparison, we use the output of an attack A
that was run for 20 iterations as a baseline. ILAP runs for
10 iterations starting from scratch with the output of attack
A after 10 iterations as reference. The learning rate is set to
0.002 for both I-FGSM and MI-FGSM4.
3We reimplemented all attacks except for Deepfool which is from the
original repo. For C&W, we used randomized targeted version, since it has
better performance.
4Tuning the learning rate does not substantially affect transferability,
as shown in Appendix G.
We then show that we can select a nearly-optimal layer for
transferability using only the source model. Moreover, ILAF
allows further tuning to improve the performance across
layers. Finally, we demonstrate that ILAP also improves
transferability under the more complex setting of ImageNet
[4].
4.1. ILAP Targeted at Different L Values
To confirm the effectiveness of our attack, we fix a single
source model and baseline attack method, and then check
how ILAP transfers to the other models compared to the
baseline attack. Results for ResNet18 as the source model
and I-FGSM as the baseline method are shown in Figure 3.
Comparing the results of both methods on the other models,
we see that ILAP outperforms I-FGSM when targeting at any
intermediate layers, especially for the optimal hyperparam-
eter value of l = 4. Note that the choice of layer is crucial
for both performance on the source model and target models.
Full results are shown in Appendix A.
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Figure 3: Transfer results of ILAP against I-FGSM on
ResNet18 as measured by DenseNet121, SENet18, and
GoogLeNet on CIFAR-10 (lower accuracies indicate bet-
ter attack).
4.2. ILAP with Pre-Determined L Value
Above we demonstrated that adversarial examples pro-
duced by ILAP exhibit the strongest transferability when
targeting a specific layer (i.e. choosing a layer as the l hy-
perparameter). We wish to pre-determine this optimal value
based on the source model alone, so as to avoid tuning the
hyperparameter l. To do this, we examine the relationship be-
tween transferability and the ILAP layer disturbance values
for a given ILAP attack. We define the disturbance values
of an ILAP attack perturbation x′′ as values of the function
f(l) =
‖∆y′′l ‖2
‖∆y′l‖2 for all values of l in the source model. For
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Figure 4: Disturbance values
(‖∆y′′l ‖2
‖∆y′l‖2
)
at each layer for
ILAP targeted at layer l = 0, 1, ..., 6 for ResNet18. Observe
that the l in the legend refers to the hyperparameter set in
the ILAP attack, and afterwards the disturbance values were
computed on layers indicated by the l in the x-axis. Note
that the last peak is produced by the l = 4 ILAP attack.
each value of l in ResNet18 (the set of l is defined for each
architecture in Appendix A) we plot the disturbance values
of the corresponding ILAP attack in Figure 4. The same
figure is given for other models in Appendix B.
We notice that the adversarial examples that produce the
latest peak in the graph are typically the ones that have
highest transferability for all transferred models (Table 1).
Given this observation, we propose that the latest l that
still exhibits a peak is a nearly optimal value of l (in terms
of maximizing transferability). For example, according to
Figure 4, we would choose l = 4. Table 1 supports our
claim and shows that selecting this layer gives an optimal or
near-optimal attack.
We leave our interpretation of this method for Section
5.3.
4.3. ILAF vs. ILAP
We show that ILAF can further improve transferability
with the additional tunable hyperparameter α. The best
ILAF result for each model improves over ILAP as shown
in Table 3. However, note that the optimal α differs for
each model and requires substantial hyperparameter tuning
to outperform ILAP. Thus, ILAF can be seen as a more
model-specific version that requires more tuning, whereas
ILAP works well more generally out of the box. Full results
are in Appendix C.
4.4. ILAP on ImageNet
We also tested ILAP on ImageNet, with ResNet18,
DenseNet121, SqueezeNet, and AlexNet5 pretrained on Ima-
geNet (as provided in [17]). The learning rates for all attacks
5ResNet18 has accuracy 69.8%, DenseNet121 has accuracy 74.4%,
SqueezeNet has accuracy 58.0%.
are tuned for best performance. For I-FGSM the learning
rate is set to 0.008, for ILAP with I-FGSM to 0.01, for MI-
FGSM to 0.018, and for ILAP with MI-FGSM to 0.018. To
evaluate transferability, we tested the accuracies of different
models over adversarial examples generated from all 50000
ImageNet test images. We observe that ILAP improves over
I-FGSM and MI-FGSM on ImageNet. Results for ResNet18
as the source model and I-FGSM as the baseline attack are
shown in Figure 5. Full results in Appendix D.
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Figure 5: Transfer results of ILAP against I-FGSM on
ResNet18 as measured by DenseNet121, SqueezeNet, and
AlexNet on ImageNet (lower accuracies indicate better at-
tack).
5. Explaining the Effectiveness of Intermediate
Layer Emphasis
At a high level, we motivated projection in an intermedi-
ate feature map as a way to increase transferability. We saw
empirically that we wanted to target the layer corresponding
to the latest peak (see Figure 4) on the source model in order
to maximize transferability. In this section, we attempt to
explain the factors causing ILAP performance to vary across
layers as well as what they suggest about the optimal layer
for ILAP. As we iterate through layer indices, there are two
factors affecting our performance: the angle between the
original perturbation direction and best transfer direction
(defined below in Section 5.1) as well as the linearity of the
model decision boundary.
Below, we discuss how the factors change across layers
and affect transferability of our attack.
5.1. Angle between Best Transfer Direction and the
Original Perturbation
Motivated by [15] (where it is shown that the decision
boundaries of models with different architectures often align)
Table 1: ILAP Results
MI-FGSM C & W
Source Transfer 20 Itr 10 Itr ILAP Opt ILAP 1000 Itr 500 Itr ILAP Opt ILAP
ResNet18† 5.7% 11.3% 2.3% (6) 7.3% 5.2% 2.1% (5)
ResNet18 SENet18 33.8% 30.6% 30.6% (4) 85.4% 41.7% 41.7% (4)
(l = 4) DenseNet121 35.1% 30.4% 30.4% (4) 84.4% 41.7% 41.7% (4)
GoogLeNet 45.1% 37.7% 37.7% (4) 90.6% 57.3% 57.3% (4)
ResNet18 31.0% 27.5% 27.5% (4) 87.5% 42.7% 42.7% (4)
SENet18 SENet18† 3.3% 10.0% 2.6% (6) 6.2% 7.3% 3.1% (5)
(l = 4) DenseNet121 31.6% 27.3% 27.3% (4) 88.5% 38.5% 38.5% (4)
GoogLeNet 41.1% 34.8% 34.8% (4) 91.7% 52.1% 52.1% (4)
ResNet18 34.4% 28.1% 28.1%(6) 87.5% 37.5% 37.5% (6)
DenseNet121 SENet18 33.5% 27.7% 27.7% (6) 86.5% 34.4% 34.4% (6)
(l = 6) DenseNet121† 6.4% 4.0% 0.8%(9) 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% (9)
GoogLeNet 36.3% 30.3% 30.3% (6) 90.6% 45.8% 45.8% (6)
ResNet18 44.6% 34.5% 33.2%(3) 89.6% 63.5% 60.4% (7)
GoogLeNet SENet18 43.0% 33.5% 32.6%(3) 90.6% 53.1% 53.1% (9)
(l = 9) DenseNet121 38.9% 29.2% 28.8%(3) 89.6% 58.3% 51.0% (8)
GoogLeNet† 1.5% 1.4% 0.5% (11) 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% (12)
† Same model as the source model.
Table 1. Accuracies after attack are shown for the models (lower accuracies indicate better attack). The hyperparameter l in the
ILAP attack is being fixed for each source model as decided by the layer disturbance graphs (e.g. setting l = 4 for ResNet18
since it was the last peak in Figure 4). “Opt ILAP” refers to a 10 iteration ILAP that chooses the optimal layer (determined by
evaluating on transfer models). Perhaps surprisingly, ILAP beats out the baseline attack on the original model as well.
we define the Best Transfer Direction (BTD):
Best Transfer Direction: Let x be an image and M be a
large (but finite) set of distinct CNNs. Find x′ such that
x′ = arg max
x′ s.t. |x′−x|<
∑
m∈M
1[m(x′) 6= m(x)]
Then the Best Transfer Direction of x is BTDx = x
′−x
‖x′−x‖ .
Since our method uses the original perturbation as an
approximation for the BTD, it is intuitive that the better this
approximation is in the current feature representation, the
better our attack will perform.
We want to investigate the nature of how well a chosen
source model attack, like I-FGSM, aligns with the BTD
throughout layers. Here we measure alignment between an
I-FGSM perturbation and the BTD using the angle between
them. We investigate the alignment between the feature map
outputs of the I-FGSM perturbation and the BTD at each
layer. As shown in Figure 6, angle between the perturbation
of I-FGSM and that of the BTD decreases as we iterate the
layer indices. Therefore, the later the target layer is in the
source model, the better it is to use I-FGSM’s attack direction
as a guide. This is a factor increasing transfer attack success
rate as layer indices increase.
To test our hypothesis, we propose to eliminate this source
of variation in performance by using a multi-fool perturba-
tion as the starting perturbation for ILAP, which is a better
approximation for the BTD. As shown in Figure 7, ILAP
performs substantially better when using a multi-fool pertur-
bation as a guide rather than an I-FGSM perturbation, thus
confirming that using a better approximation of the BTD
gives better performance for ILAP. In addition, we see that
these results correspond with what we would expect from
Figure 6. In the earlier layers, I-FGSM is a worse approxi-
mation of the BTD, so passing in a multi-fool perturbation
improves performance significantly. In the later layers, I-
FGSM is a much better approximation of the BTD, and we
see that passing in a multi-fool perturbation does not increase
performance much.
5.2. Linearity of Decision Boundary
If we view I-FGSM as optimizing to cross the decision
boundary, we can interpret ILAP as optimizing to cross the
decision boundary approximated with a hyper-plane perpen-
dicular to the I-FGSM perturbation. As the layer indices
increase, the function from the feature space to the final out-
put of the source model tends to becomes increasingly linear
Table 2: ILAP vs TAP Results
TAP
Source Transfer 20 Itr Opt ILAP
ResNet18† 6.2% 1.9% (6)
ResNet18 SENet18 31.6% 28.4% (4)
(l = 4) DenseNet121 32.7% 28.5% (4)
GoogLeNet 41.6% 36.8% (4)
ResNet18 31.4% 23.5% (4)
SENet18 SENet18† 2.0% 1.7% (5)
(l = 4) DenseNet121 31.3% 24.1% (4)
GoogLeNet 41.5% 33.1% (4)
ResNet18 35.2% 27.4% (6)
DenseNet121 SENet18 34.2% 26.8% (7)
(l = 6) DenseNet121† 4.8% 1.0% (9)
GoogLeNet 37.8% 29.8% (6)
ResNet18 37.1% 33.6% (9)
GoogLeNet SENet18 36.5% 32.9% (9)
(l = 9) DenseNet121 32.6% 28.1% (9)
GoogLeNet† 1.3% 0.4% (12)
† Same model as source model.
Table 2. Same as experiment in Table 1 but with TAP. Hy-
perparameters for TAP are set to lr = 0.002,  = 0.03, λ =
0.005, α = 0.5, s = 3, η = 0.01.
Table 3: ILAP vs ILAF
Model ILAP (best) ILAF (best)
DenseNet121 27.7% 26.6%
GoogLeNet 35.8% 34.7%
SENet18 27.5% 26.3%
Table 3. Here we show the difference in transfer perfor-
mance between ILAP vs. ILAF generated on ResNet18
(with optimal hyperparameters for both attacks).
(there are more nonlinearities between earlier layers and the
final layer than there are between a later layer and the final
layer). In fact, we note that at the final layer, the decision
boundary is completely linear. Thus, our linear approxima-
tion of the decision boundary becoming more accurate is one
factor in improving ILAP performance as we select the later
layers.
We define the “true decision boundary” as a majority-
vote ensemble of a large number of CNNs. Note that for
transfer, we care less about how well we are approximating
the source model decision boundary than we do the true
decision boundary. In most feature representations we expect
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Figure 6: As shown in the above figure, in terms of angle,
I-FGSM produces a better approximation for the estimated
best transfer direction as we increase the layer index.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Layer Index
10
20
30
40
50
60
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 a
fte
r A
tta
ck
Multi-fool vs ILA on ResNet18
DenseNet121 multi ILAP
DenseNet121 ILAP
GoogLeNet multi ILAP
GoogLeNet ILAP
SENet18 multi ILAP
SENet18 ILAP
Figure 7: Here we show that ILAP with a better approxima-
tion for BTD (multi-fool) performs better. In addition, using
a better approximation for BTD disproportionately improves
the earlier layers’ performance.
that the true decision boundary is more linear, as ensembling
reduces variance. However, note that at least in the final
layer, by virtue of the source model decision boundary being
exactly linear, the true decision boundary cannot be more
linear, and is likely to be less linear.
We hypothesize that this flip is what causes us to per-
form worse in the final layers. In these layers, the source
model decision boundary is more linear than the true deci-
sion boundary, so our approximation performs poorly. We
test this hypothesis by attacking two variants of ResNet18
augmented with 3 linear layers before the last layer: one
variant with activations following the added layers and one
without. As shown in Figure 8, ILAP performance decreases
less in the first variant. Also note that these nonlinearities
also cause worse ILAP performance earlier in the network.
Thus, we conclude that the extreme linearity of the last
several layers is associated with ILAP performing poorly.
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Figure 8: Where there is more nonlinearity present in the
later portion of the network, the performance of ILAP does
not deteriorate as rapidly.
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Figure 9: Overview of explanatory factors that affect ILAP’s
performance.
5.3. Explanation of the main result
In this section, we tie together all of the above factors
to explain the optimal intermediate layer for transferability.
Denote:
• the decreasing angle difference between I-FGSM’s and
BTD’s perturbation direction as Factor 1
• the increasing linearity with respect to the decision
boundary as we increase layer index as Factor 2, and
• the excessive linearity of the source model decision
boundary as Factor 3
On the transfer models, as the index of the attacked source
model layer increases, Factors 1 and 2 increase attack rate,
while Factor 3 decreases the attack rate. Thus, before some
layer, Factors 1 and 2 cause transferability to increase as
layer index increases - however, afterward, Factor 3 wins
out and causes transferability to decrease as the layer index
increases. Thus the layer right before the point where this
switch happens is the layer that is optimal for transferability
(see Figure 9 for a visual overview).
We note that this explanation would also justify the
method presented in Section 4.2. Intuitively, having a peak
corresponds with having the linearized decision boundary
(from using projection as the objective) be very different
from the source model’s decision boundary. If this were not
the case, then I-FGSM would presumably have found this
improved perturbation already. As such, choosing the last
layer that we can get a peak at corresponds with both having
enough room (the peak) and as linear of a decision boundary
as possible (as late of a layer as possible).
On the source model, since there is no notion of a “trans-
fer” attack, Factor 3 and Factor 1 do not have any effect.
Therefore, Factor 2 causes the performance of the later lay-
ers to improve, so much so that at the final layer ILAP’s
performance on the source model is actually equal or better
on all the attacks we used as baselines (see Figure 3). We
hypothesize the improved performance on the source model
is the result of a simpler loss and thus an easier to optimize
loss landscape.
6. Conclusion
We introduce a novel attack, coined ILA, that aims to
enhance the transferability of any given adversarial example.
It is a framework with the goal of enhancing transferability
by increasing projection onto the Best Transfer Direction.
Within this framework, we propose two variants, ILAP and
ILAF, and analyze their performance. We demonstrate that
there exist specific intermediate layers that we can target
with ILA to substantially increase transferability with respect
to the attack baselines. In addition, we show that a near-
optimal target layer can be selected without any knowledge
of transfer performance. Finally, we provide some intuition
regarding ILA’s performance and why it performs differently
in different feature spaces.
Potential future work include making use of the interac-
tions between ILA and existing adversarial attacks to explain
differences among existing attacks, as well as extending ILA
to perturbations produced for different settings (universal or
targeted perturbations). In addition, other methods of attack-
ing intermediate feature spaces could be explored, taking
advantage of the properties we explored in this paper.
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